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VOIR DIRE:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE DEFENSE
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the
part of rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindic-
tiveness on the part of the people. Indeed, it is often more
important to guard against the latter than the former.
MR. JUSTICE STORY
Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States. 18831
I. INTRODUCTION
L ITERALLY INTERPRETED, Voir Dire means to speak the truth7--and
therein lies the problem.3 It is defense counsel who must be prepared
to probe deeply in an effort to uproot the true convictions of the potential
jurors.4 This is not to suggest that those jurors being administered the
voir dire are engaged in a conscious effort to deceive the court (although
obviously, some are), but rather that unconscious deception often is
practiced to mask prejudices which if consciously admitted, would
threaten a person's psychological well-being.5 It is most difficult, indeed,
for one to assert such deeply held feelings as racist, political or religious
prejudices, but they do exist, and must be coped with.6 This dilemma is
one of considerable import in all trials, though when the setting is one
in the "political" or "social" arena, the ramifications take on new
dimensions of acuteness. The defendant's appearance, philosophies,
attitudes or life style can invoke the jurors' fears and prejudices, which
1 Justice Story cites from 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 349, 350 and 4 BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES 379-381.
2 State v. McRae, 200 N.C. 149, 155, 156 S.E. 800, 803 (1931); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1746 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3 The prejudices which all people harbor to one degree or another were well recog-
nized by Charles Garry in his defense of Huey P. Newton. State v. Newton, No.
41266, Super. Ct. Alameda County, Sept. 27, 1968. See A. GINGER, MINIMIZING
RAcISM IN JURY TRIALs-THE VoIR DIRE CONDUCTED BY CHARLES GARRY IN STATE
v. NEWTON (1968) [hereinafter cited as GINGER]. See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966); Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Broeder].
4 Additionally, it should be noted that in many jurisdictions the trial judge is an
active participant in the voir dire. This is also true in the federal sphere which is
governed by FED. R. CIrv. P. 42(a) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
5Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 241-43 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Kuhn]. See also GINGER, supra note 2, at xix, xx.
6 C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 66-79 (1962).
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create an impregnable wall off which evidence will merely bounce or be
twisted. This situation fosters something less than the fair and equitable
administration of justice; and as a result, commentary correctly signaling
the demise of another element in the American judicial system.
It is the considered judgment of many distinguished commentators
that the judicial structure is in grave trouble, and that only an enormous
amount of reordering will save it from total collapse. 7 If one considers the
fact that the foundation of any system of social order must by definition
rest upon the support of those who subject themselves to its scheme, then
those who echo doom may in fact be resounding the already begun
erosion. With the courts increasingly being the forum for legal disputes
between those who demand change in the superstructure and those who
represent (or are) the structure, a rather unfortunate by-product has
evolved: a feeling that the courts can no longer adequately dispense
justice.8 This manifests itself in beliefs that if one is prosecuted for
activities that were designed to advance social change, either in violation
of the law or not, that the individual will not be afforded a fair
trial; 9 a reflection that the social or political activist will not be
judged by an impartial jury.
It is obvious that these feelings are not pure truth or pure fallacy, but
rather, part of a social milieu of frustration, misinformation, emotionalism,
and fear. For the purposes of this comment, it is enough to assume that
this proposition has considerable validity. As such, the writer's goal in this
comment is to supply information to assist in selecting impartial jurors,
and as residual value, to restore a small amount of the mortar which has
been chipped away from the foundation of the philosophy of justice.
H. VOIR DIRE PREPARATION: PRE-SELECTION INVESTIGATION
The right to trial by jury is nothing more than an empty promise
if the jury is less than impartial.' 0 To minimize the chances of this
occurrence, it is imperative that the first step in the preparation stage be
a complete assembly of all available information relating to the case. Once
7See E. CAHN, TiE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949); R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA(1970); Dowm, JUSTICE DENIED-THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE COURTS (1971);
R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM-A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965);S. ROSENBLATr, JUSTICE DENIED (1971); Hufstedler, New Blacks for Old Pyramids--
Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971). See also Dolan, Law
and the Class Struggle, JURIS DOCTOR (April 1971).
8 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER
REPORT (1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT]; Lefcourt, Law Against the
People, in LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE 21-22 (1971).
9 THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT ASPECTS OF PROTEST AND CON-
FRONTATION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 323-24 (J. Skolnick ed. 1969).
lOSee Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See also Lee v. Baltimore Hotel,
345 Mo. 458, 464, 136 S.W.2d 695, 698 (1939).
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compiled, this information then becomes a tool which is not only of great
value during the voir dire, but also throughout the entire litigation, in
that it serves as an excellent reference for cross-examination, direct
examination and evidentiary matters.
Because the voir dire is controlled by statute in most jurisdictions,"
the statutory mandate becomes the first area of investigation. In almost
every instance, the statute will define the general nature of acceptable
questions,' 2 the grounds for challenge for cause," the number of
peremptory challenges,"4 and the relationship between the trial judge
and the attorneys in the examination of the potential jurors.'5 With a
comprehensive knowledge of the statutes and case law of the jurisdiction,
the second and most tedious task begins.
It is desirable that the defense compile an up-to-date statistical
profile on the residents of the county and the community from which
the juror array (statistical universe) is determined. There are three
reasons for this procedure:
1. The information may later be used for statistical evidence in
a challenge to the array.
2. The information will assist in the question design for the
actual voir dire.
3. The information may assist attorneys from other jurisdictions in
understanding the composition of the community.
The primary source of data is the local public library which generally
keeps complete up-to-date census tracts" which provide average income,
race, religious preference, political affiliations, age breakdowns and
employment profiles. A secondary source in some jurisdictions will be
the county courthouse which may provide specialized voter information,
and in some cases, demographic data on past juries. Both sources can
provide valuable data on the general composition of the array and
its subsequent juries.
The second major area in this stage is the collection and cross-
referencing of each and every reference to the case made in the news
media or general public. This includes the reporting of the incident at
its first instance, the news coverage to date, and a complete list of every
11 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2313, 2945.17-2945.36 (1953).
12 OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.27 (1957).
13OHIO REV. CODE 12945.25 (1953).
14 OHIO REV. CODE H 2945.21-2945.22 (1953).
5 OHIO REV. CODE 12945.27 (1957).
16 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS TRACT REPORTS, Series PHC (1) (1971);
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS,
Series PC (1)-C (1971); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrIED STATES (92d ed. 1971).
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person who commented upon the case publicly. The reasons for this
information are obvious in that:
1. It may be used to argue a change of venue.
2. It may be used in an appeal based on pre-trial publicity.
3. In the voir dire this type of data is necessary to:
a) Check the level of general news media pre-trial bias, and
b) To correlate comments made by specific potential jurors-a
situation which is usually grounds for challenge for cause."
What has been suggested in the pre-selection area may appear to
some to be over-detailing and too time-consuming. Neither is true. The
socio-cultural background of jurors creates tremendous conflicts between
what they perceive as acceptable avenues of change and what the social
or political defendant believes is necessary.18 Thus, it becomes essential
that in the defense of activists, every positive factor be utilized in an
attempt to get the least unfavorable predisposed panel of jurors.
Ill. CHALLENGING THE ARRAY
The Kerner Commission found that the United States is a racist
nation, and through conscious or unconscious endeavor reflects it in
almost every area of life. 19 The ghettos are geared economically to
regeneration, 20 the availability of housing has traditionally been anti-
minority, 2 employment opportunities are pro-white,22 the welfare system
(primarily non-white) is a tangled web of perpetual degradation, 23
education has classically been white, 24 and last but surely not least, is the
17 State v. Huffman, 86 Ohio St. 229, 99 N.E. 295 (1912); OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.
25(B) (1953).
18 See generally GINGER, supra note 2; Lefcourt, Law Against the People, supra
note 8.
19 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2, 145, 203; M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER
AMERICA 63-82 (1962). See also supra notes 20-25.
20 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 413-24; J. K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
250-58 (1962); HARRINGTON, supra note 19, at 73-80; Clobe, The Economic Basis of
the Law and the State, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 65-80.
21 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 467-82. Though the area of housing is still in
dire need of considerable revamping, some advancement has been seen in case law.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Javins v. First National
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 203; HARRINGTON, supra note 19, at 63-82.
23 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 203; W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 70, 92
(1970).
24 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 424-56; HARRINOTON, supra note 19, at 63-82;
Rockwell, The Education of the Capitalist Lawyer: The Law School, in LAW AGAINST
THE PEOPLE 90-104, supra note 8.
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judicial structure-which is white. 25 In face of this a black man or woman
comes to trial, either innocent or guilty of the charge, but with a much
more substantial chance of being convicted and of receiving a longer
sentence because of white racism.26 The why of this type of justice
obviously flows from every element of racism practiced; thus the task is to
isolate individual segments of prejudice so as to effectively combat
its continuance and growth. One element where considerable work is
needed to remedy racism is in the selection process of the trier of fact.
It should be noted that the following discussion would not be
necessary if the state legislature would enact procedures to guarantee that
racism in jury selection would be minimized. It is hardly startling that until
juries represent the minority elements of society they will not be the
genuine conscience of the community. The right to a jury trial is basic and
deeply ingrained in this country's heritage, 27 a right which by its very
nature embraces the right to a fair and impartial jury. As such, the
constitutional right to a trial by jury28 has been held to include an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. 29
In almost every jurisdiction the method of designating the array
from which the panel will be chosen is, either intentionally or not, one
which fosters racism.30 In an effort to rectify this, counsel may look to the
challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge, but both may fail for
a number of reasons. First, the challenge for cause will necessarily fall
short because of the inevitable concreteness required,31 and the peremptory
is not only limited in number,3 2 but and can be used by the prosecutor to
further solidify racism because of its use against blacks.33 The main reason
for the challenge's ineffectiveness, however, is integral to the very nature
of the challenge; that is, the challenge is in reality, one of selection based
upon rejection. In reality, there exists no right to select, only the privilege
25 KERNER REPORT, supra note 8, at 337-57; Broeder, supra note 3; Bums, Racism
and American Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 38-54; Lefcourt,
Law Against the People, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE 21-35; Bums, Can a Black
Man Get a Fair Trial In This Country, New York Times Magazine, July 5, 1970.
26 KALVEN & ZEisEL, supra note 3, at 58-61, 210-211; Broeder, supra note 3.
27 Commonwealth Dept of Highways v. Garland, Kentucky, 394 S.W.2d 450 (Ky.
1965).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 9 Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316 (1885); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942); Lee v. Baltimore Hotel, 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695 (1939).
30 See GINGER, supra note 3, at 3-5, 206-241; KUHN, supra note 5, at 237; Broeder,
supra note 3, at 25; Moore, Brown v. Board of Education-The Court's Relationship
to Black Liberation, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 62.
31 GINGER, supra note 3, at xxi; KUHN, supra note 5, at 243; Note, The Jury: A
Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as The Jury].
32 Omo REv. CODE § 12945.21-2945.22 (1953).
33 GINGER, supra note 3, at xxi; The Jury, supra note 31, at 1429-30.
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to reject. Consequently, one is continually trying to replace racist jurors
from an array which is similarly biased. This results in a dichotomy
between reality and theory that may make it necessary to challenge
the entire array.
The process of selection in the state courts is a matter of local
concern, governed by state statutes, 34 which are generally broad enough to
leave considerable discretion to the local bench.3 5 Although the various
systems differ from state to state, and county to county, the general
practices are almost universal.3 6 There is either a master list, population,
array or universe; all amount to the same thing-the group of prospective
jurors. From the array, those who are not qualified under state statute are
stricken,37 as are those who are found to be exempt 38 or excused.3 9 From
the remaining names, panels are chosen by lot or some other method of
chance, such as jury wheels. At this stage the voir dire is supposed
to further eliminate those not qualified due to partiality. The mythical
result is an impartial and unprejudiced jury that reflects the conscience
of the community. The difficulty is that right from the moment of
inception the prejudice begins because of the "tainted population." There
is a direct correlation between this result and the method by which
the population is determined.
The two most common methods of selection are the "Key Man" and
the "Public List."' 40 The key man is the most repugnant if judged by
democratic standards of equal and fair representation. Under this
approach, the jury commissioner or his counterpart selects from the
community "key men" who recommend others for jury service. This
presents two immediate obstacles to obtaining a representative jury. The
first is the mirror effect: that people generally associate with those who
reflect their own socio-economic class, interests, and backgrounds. This
presents a definite problem for the social or political defendant because it
would be safe to assume that the defendant and his peers are not
rcognized as "key man" material by-the commissioner. The second area
of difficulty arises from the fact that by the system's very design, it is open
to jury stacking. It does not take a conspiratory mentality to grasp the
possibility that in trials of political import the "key men" may be, either
consciously or unconsciously, over zealous in protecting their vested
interests. As a result of these two major flaws, a "sub-culture" is created
34 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2313, 2945.17-2945.36 (1953).
35 Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St. 328 (1885); OHIO REV. CODE H1 2945.25 (1953),
2945.27 (1957).
36 See generally GINGER, supra note 3.
37 Omo REV. CODE 12313.06 (1953).
38 OHIo REV. CODE 12313.12 (1953).
39 OHO REV. CODE 12313.16 (1953).
40 Kuhn, supra note 3; The Jury, supra note 31, at 1421-22. See also KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 3.
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that is no more representative of a community cross-section than is any
sub-culture representative of the whole.
The "Public List" system, though not quite so noxious as the "key
man" approach, is no rose either. The lists are usually drawn from the
tax lists, voter registration files, or telephone directories.41 All three
discriminate either economically, socially, or both. Tax lists, especially
those based on property taxes (either real or personal), and voter
registration lists are both guilty of socio-economic discrimination.42 The
former obviously accreditable to the realities of poverty, and the latter
to the frustration of the same. Telephone directories are somewhat less
discriminatory with the increasing subscription to this service, though
this also discriminates against the poor.
The standard selection processes are discriminatory, and at best,
constitutionally questionable. 43 When the forum is one with social or
political overtones, the defense must challene at every available instance
that very system which created these conditions. What follows is a fine
example of such a challenge. It was filed by Charles R. Gary in his
defense of Black Panther, Huey P. Newton.4
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
No. 41266
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Plaintifl
MOTION TO QUASH THE ENTIRE
MASTER PANEL AND JURY VENTURE
vs.
HUEY P. NEWTON,
Defendant
Defendant hereby moves to quash the master panel of
jurors; e.g., the entire jury venire on the grounds that black
persons, culturally different, and persons of lower economic
status have been systematically excluded and are substantially
under-represented in said panel, by virtue of the fact that the
use of voter's registration lists without supplementation, does, as
did the intelligence test rejected in Peop. v. Craig, No. 41750 in
the above entitled court (April 18, 1968) result in the dispropor-
41 Lindquist, An Analyses of Juror Selection Procedure in the United States District
Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 34 (1967).
42 GINGER, supra note 3, at 3-5, 206-241. See also The Jury, supra note 31.
43 Kuhn, supra note 5, at 265-72; The Jury, supra note 31, at 1434-40.
44 GINGER, supra note 3, at 3-12. Huey P. Newton was indicted for the murder of an
Oakland, California, policeman, John Frey. The alleged murder occurred at 6:00 A.M.
on October 28, 1967.
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tionate exclusion of identifiable groups, specifically racial
minorities and lower income citizens, and produces a master
panel which is not representative of the community at large, and
particularly not of the black ghetto of Oakland, in violation of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Said motion to quash the venire is also based upon
the prevalence and existence of white racism amongst the
predominantly white persons on said panel and the inability of
many of said white persons to understand black culture, or
perceive or objectively judge persons manifesting personality
and cultural differences from the predominantly white culture.
The motion will be based on this notice, all the pleadings
and files in this case, the memorandum of points and authorities
filed herewith in support of the motion, the Brief Amicus Curiae
of social scientists filed herein, and the Declarations of Bernard
L. Diamond, M.D., Robert Blauner, Ph.D., Jan Dizard, Ph.D.,
Sheldon Messigner, Ph.D. and other Declarations to be filed in
support of the motion, and on evidence and oral argument
to be heard at the time and motion comes on for hearing.
GARY, DREYFUS, McTERNAN & BROTSKY
By (CHARLES R. GARRY)
Attorneys for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY VENIRE
I. Black persons, culturally different, and persons
of lower economic status have been systemat-
ically excluded and are substantially under-
represented by the present use of voters' lists.
Since the ruling of Judge Avakian in Peo. v. Craig, No.
41750 in the Superior Court of the State of California in and
for the County of Alameda (filed April 18, 1968) the jury panels
for trial have been drawn from the voters' registration lists of
said county. Judge Avakian considered the question of whether
the limitation of the jury panel to registered voters is itself too
narrow. (See p. 16 et seq.)
Because the statistics and the data and evidence were not
before him at that time, the court stated that he felt the
percentage of adults otherwise qualified for jury service who
failed to register in Alameda County "is probably small...
since intensive voter registration drives take place before each
state and national election and no group is discouraged from
registering or voting."
It is clear from the tenor of the court's opinion that upon
a showing that a large percentage of black people, other
minority racial groups, the culturally different, and lower
economic status persons are not registered, that the court
would also have struck down the use of voters' lists alone,
without augmentation from other sources, as not providing
[Vol. 5:2
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the constitutionally required "random selection of a fair cross
section of the persons residing in the community."
The use of voters' lists without supplementation, as did
the intelligence test rejected in the Craig test, results in the
disproportionate exclusion of identifiable groups, specifically
racial minorities and lower income citizens, and consequently
produces a master panel which is not representative of the
community at large, in violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
the jury venire must be quashed in the instant case.
Although popular conception is otherwise, there has been
a substantial increase in non-voting and in occasional voting in
this country in the last three-quarters of a century. (See Walter
Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political
Universe," 59 American Political Science Review, No. 1
[March, 1965] page 22.) At pages 22-23 Burnham states:
"The late 19th century voting universe (in the United
States) was marked by a more complete... voting participation
among the American electorate than ever before or since."
Burnham sets forth the following percentages:
Peripheral
Core Voters Voters Non-Voters
Late 19th Century ....... 66% 10% 24%
Present day ............ 44% 16% 40%
Core voters are those who vote regularly, while peripheral
voters are those who vote occasionally. These statistics show, as
Burnham states, a "political apathy on a scale quite unknown
anywhere in the Western world."
All studies on the subject show that the non-voters are not
randomly distributed in the adult population. Social scientists
have found that a variety of differences exist between voters and
non-voters, psychological, attitudinal and demographic. Seymour
Martin Lipset, Professor of Sociology at Harvard University,
formerly of the University of California, Berkeley, summarizing
a variety of recent voting studies, shows that the following
groups tend to vote at a higher rate: men (as opposed to women),
those with a higher level of education, those aged 35-55 years,
married persons, higher status persons, and members of organi-
zations. Businessmen, white collar workers and government
workers vote at a higher rate than do unskilled workers,
servants and service workers, amongst which black persons and
minority groups are heavily represented. (Lipset, Political Man,
Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y., 1963, pp. 187-189; see also
V. 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, Thomas
Y. Crowell Co., New York, 1958, pp. 633-634.
A recent basic study 'by Angus Campbell concludes that
Catholic religious affiliation and higher income are significant
VoiR DinE
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attributes of the voter. (Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides,
Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, Ill., 1954, pp. 70-73.)
Precise estimates of the variation in voter turnout rate along
these various factors are available and show serious under-
representation by the groups amongst which black persons are
heavily over-represented. These findings are unequivocal by nor-
mal measurement standards of the social and statistical sciences.
The black community in the United States and in Alameda
County is distributed along many of the dimensions listed above
in quite different proportions than in the white community. (It
is to be noted that Judge Avakian stated in his opinion that the
residents of West Oakland are predominantly black and of low
economic income.) See p. 14.
Blacks have a lower overall level of formal education,
lower occupational level, lower income, and a lower proportion
of Catholics than do whites. It also has been found that income
makes more of a difference in voting turnout for Negroes than
it does for whites. (See Edward Litchfield, "A Case Study
of Negro Political Behavior in Detroit," 5 Public Opinion
Quarterly, No. 2 [June, 1941] page 269).
In the classic study referred to supra, The Voter Decides,
Campbell presents the following turnout estimates by race for
two recent presidential elections:
Negro White
1948 ............ 36% (61) 66% (585)
1952 ............ 33% (157) 79% (1453)
Although turnout rates vary election to election, the cross-racial
differences remain strong: an average for these two elections of
a 38% lower Negro turnout.
Although the above stated data included the southern
region, where Negro voting is of course far lower than in the
west and north, the data from other studies bear out Lipset's
conclusion that voting turnout of northern Negroes is lower than
that of northern whites. (Lipset, Political Man, supra, p. 209;
see also Lipset, et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis
of Political Behavior" in Gardner Lindzey [ed.] Handbook of
Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.,
Reading, Mass., 1954, Vol. 2, p. 1132; see also Litchfield's case
study of Negro political behavior in Detroit 1930-40, 5 Pub.
Opinion Quarterly, supra, at page 268, and Litchfield, Political
Behavior in a Metropolitan Community [1941]). For the five
elections studied in the Litchfield Detroit study, the average
Negro turnout of registered voters was 54.3% and the
average native white turnout was 75.1%; it must be noted that
failure to vote in a general election removes the voter from
the registration lists.
[Vol. 5:2
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These findings are confirmed by Oscar Glantz' study of the
Negro voter in northern industrial cities. (See Glantz, "The
Negro Voter in Northern Industrial Cities," 13 Western Political
Quarterly, No. 4 [December, 1960], pp. 999-1000).
Glantz examined the 1948, 1952 and 1956 presidential
ballots in Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City,
Pittsburgh and St. Louis. His results showed the average Negro
voting rate for the seven cities over the three elections to lag
far behind the overall voting rate. The average Negro rate of
turnout of registered voters was 73.6% and for the total
registered population 83.4%. These statistics must be further
modified by the fact that Negroes and whites are not registered
at the same rate. The effect of the varying suffrage laws in the
north results in the following statistics, indicating an enormous
cross-racial difference of 30%:
Frequency of past voting
Negro White
Voted in all or most elections . . . 43% 73%
Voted in some or no elections . . . 57% 27%
Number of cases (111) (2268)
The available data indicate that in the north Negro voting
lags at least 20% behind white voting, and probably 30%
behind it. About two-fifths of eligible northern Negroes vote at
least most of the time, compared to about seven-tenths of their
white counterparts. Negro non-voting is not strictly voluntary.
Negroes forced to move while job hunting will often not meet
residence requirements for voting. Burnham's study cites several
of the well-known features of the American policy that effec-
tively make many persons involuntary non-voters today. And for
a description of the plight and lives of urban Negroes which
contribute to their non-voting behavior, see Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Bantam
Books, N.Y., 1968, an exhibit now filed with this court.
The higher negative contact with the law, as defendants,
which characterizes the plight of the blacks in the urban ghetto
also disqualifies them from voters' lists and thus from jury service.
Some special factors which should be noted are that fewer
people vote in off years, and thus the current Alameda County
voters' lists, drawn as they are from the 1966 or 1967 elections,
make the present juror universe even less representative than
usual. The findings presented from eastern and midwestern cities
herein hold true for Alameda County and the far west; see the
analysis in "The Negro Voter in the Far West," published by
Loren Miller in 26 The Journal of Negro Education, No. 3
(summer, 1957) page 263, wherein the author shows that both
registration and voting of Negroes have lagged in California
and in the rest of the Far West.
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II. The venire should be quashed because of the
racism prevalent in the white jurors and because
using the present master panel will result in a
largely white jury* which does not, and under
present circumstances cannot, objectively under-
stand, perceive or judge persons of black culture
and personality patterns.
The racism prevalent in white Americans today is docu-
mented in the accompanying declarations and Brief Amicus
Curiae of the social scientists. This severe problem or racism
affects our society generally, and the black defendant's possi-
bility of a fair trial and poses a serious challenge to the ability of
the administration of justice to follow constitutional imperatives.
The problem of the culturally different and the bias implicit
in the legal system poses another severe threat to the possibility
of the defendant's obtaining a fair trial under the circumstances
of this case. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is the
study by the Anthropolgist, Daniel H. Swett, Department of
Anthropology, San Francisco State College, entitled Built-in
Biases in the American Legal System.
Further considerations are as follows:
Negro Americans across the nation and particularly in
Oakland and Alameda County are discussing "black culture"
and Negro distinctiveness. From Harlem to Watts there has been
a proliferation of black theatre, art, and literary groups. In his
book, Urban Blues, the anthropologist Charles Keil uses the
blues singer and his audience as the raw materials to outline
the distinctive traits and ethos of Negro-American culture,
finding the core of this culture in the "soul" ideology. Keil notes
that Negroes have a dearly bought experimental wisdom, a
"perspective by incongruity" that provides black Americans
a unique outlook on life that cannot be shared by whites.
Judge Avakian's opinion states that "One can well imagine
how different the results (of intelligence test rejected therein)
if half of the vocabulary questions were related to "soul" food,
people and music and other terms commonly spoken in West
Oakland but almost unheard and unread in Montclair."
The traditional process of all other ethnic immigrant
groups to America, involving occupational mobility and the
ethnic's increasing contract with dominant institutions, especially
education, does not fit the cultural experience of most
Afro-Americans. How a minority group enters the host society
has fateful, if not permanent consequences. The very manner
in which Africans became Americans constituted a rape of
traditional culture and social organization. The black man did
* Counsel here notes that should the prosecution peremptorially excuse all
black persons who are seated in the jury box, objection based on the
unconstitutionality of this practice and of the result will be made.
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not enter this country with a group identity as a Negro. This
group category could only be formed by the slavemaking
operation which vitiated the meaning and relevance of the
traditional African identities. The cultural process could
therefore not be one of movement from ethnic group to
assimilation, since Negroes were not an ethnic group.
But sources of black culture today are Africa, slavery, the
south, emancipation and northern migration, and racism itself.
The racist oppression provides the basis for a more elaborate
and more ethnic cultural response than does class exploitation
and lower class status. Negro American culture is an ethnic as
well as a class culture because the history of black people in the
United States has produced a residue of shared collective
memories and frames of reference. It is because black Americans
have undergone unique experiences in America, experiences that
no other national or racial minority or lower class group have
shared, that a distinctive ethnic culture has evolved. Though this
culture is overwhelmingly the product of American experience,
the first contributing source is still African. And the single most
dominant factor from today's urban black experience that sets
him apart from his white counterpart is contact with the police,
described in the Kerner report as the chief complaint of all
black communities, and resonant with overtones of brutality.
This chief component of black experience, the white American,
whether racist or not, does not and cannot share. It is a vital
issue in the present proceeding and points up the impossibility of
a jury of substantially white persons being able to perceive and
objectively render fair judgment in the present case with the
meaning of due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
The aesthetic and linguistic principles that underlie Negro-
American music and dialect, as well as some movement patterns
and religious orientations, have their origins in those peoples,
tribes and kingdoms that furnished the slave trade. The first
great source of black culture in America is slavery. White
Americans have undergone, experienced, or concerned them-
selves with these institutions from an entirely different point of
view. A further source of Negro-American culture, the promises,
betrayals and frustrations that followed upon emancipation,
cannot be shared by white persons. The great mobility, the
moving about and restlessness that characterizes the life of many
blacks came directly from this phenomenon (and rendered
many Negroes ineligible as voters and thus as potential jurors)
and was related to the mobility and promise of the north, the
attractions of industry, the push from a depleted southland
following emancipation. Finally the racist society made no
serious move to assimilate black Americans, and for this reason
the Negro ghettos have served more as the setting for the flower-
ing of a distinctive ethnicity, whereas the immigrant ghettos of
other groups (Jews, Irish, etc.) were actually way stations in the
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process of acculturation and assimilation. Thus analogies from
these other ghettos will not serve in the present instance.
In the black community, in different ways than in the
white, economic pressures strain the family and matriarchal
trends are visible. Particular styles of music, language, style
of dress and movement are consciously cultivated. A sense of
fatalism, even apathy or quasi-paranoid outlooks pervades the
streets. Against some of this, and yet incorporating some of
the black heritage and style, the modem national liberation
black groups struggle for manhood and a new identity as blacks.
As a member of this sub-culture and this militant liberation
group, the defendant herein is virtually a stranger to most of the
white American voters who will make up the jury under
prevailing practice. They are not his peers. They are part of the
continuing racist structure that has served to consolidate rather
than to erase the distinctive experience of the black past. No
other lower class group in America's pluralistic society has met
in the past or meets in the present the systematic barriers of
categorical exclusion, blockage and discrimination based on race
and color. Through this continuing struggle to surmount and
change a racist social system, black Americans have created
a political history which is the core of the emerging ethnic
culture and the clue to contemporary revitalization movement
which celebrates blackness. Can a white jury understand the
pressures, attitudes, beliefs, on a leader of such a movement?
Can such a defendant be constitutionally tried by a jury that
perceives him with a racist bias?
It is unpleasant for white Americans to accept the unpleasant
fact that America remains a racist society. This awareness of
racism is also obscured by the fact that more sophisticated,
subtle and indirect forms, that might be termed "neoracism"
tend to replace the traditional, open forms that were most highly
elaborated in the old south. But the two key characteristics of
the racist social structure still obtain:
(1) the division based upon color being the single most
important split within the society, the body politic and national
psyche, and (2) the various processes and practices of exclusion,
rejection and subjection based on color are built into the major
public institutions such as labor, market, education, politics and
law enforcement, with the effect of maintaining special privi-
leges, power and values for the benefit of the white majority.
III. Conclusion
The constitutional requirement, and the policy of the State
of California and of the United States that all litigants entitled to
a trial by jury "shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community in
the district or division wherein the court convenes" (28 U.S.C.
1861) requires that sources other than the voter lists must be
[Vol. 5:2
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 5 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/5
Spring, 1972]
used when necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights
secured by said section. Under the circumstances herein
described, it is necessary to use census tracts and not the voters'
lists to obtain a random and fair cross-section of the community.
The venire as presently composed must be quashed.
Respectfully submitted,
GARRY, DREYFUS, McTERNAN & BROTSKY
By (CHARLES R. GARRY) 45
Attorneys for Defendant
Though the Motion was not entirely successful, it did lead Judge
Avakian to declare that the so-called intelligence test for jurors could no
longer be used in Alameda County, California, because it produced
unrepresentative juries. 46 It is exactly these types of motions and appeals
which, if utilized continuously, will chip away at the lack of representation
inherent in most juries until the jury is truly a reflection of the community.
IV. VOIR DIRE QUESTION DESIGN
Social and political trials, by necessity, demand a multipurpose voir
dire. The defense must not only be prepared to cope with the problems of
prejudice and bias, but will also be faced with an equally urgent task
of education. "Sub-cultures," be they Black, poverty, youth, radical or any
other social segment striving for structural change, are individually unique
and must be approached singularly. Consequently, the juror must be
directed to a mental state whereby at least comprehension, if not empathy,
is realized in regard to the defendant's cultural sphere. The juror must be
led to the point of being able to grasp the environmental bankruptcy
of the ghetto,47 the frustration of political activists, 48 or the personal
degradation which is fundamental to the welfare system.49 This does not
imply that the juror need an in-depth understanding of great compassion
for the defendant's segment of society (though both would be ideal);
rather, the juror must be cognizant of the fact that these micro-societies
do exist and must be recognized as social forces. With this knowledge, the
juror will not be quite so surprised to learn that ghetto residents arm
themselves, that political radicals use rather strong language at times, or
that the mother receiving Aid to Dependent Children has the "gall"
to picket the welfare office.
45 Reprinted by permission from GINGER, supra note 3, at 3-12 [Appellate brief at
206-2411.
46 GINGER, supra note 3, at xix.
47 Clark, The Cry of the Ghetto, in MAN AGAINST POVERTY: WORLD WAR III 109-118
(A. Blaustein & R. Wook ed. 1968).
4 8 See DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 23, at 53-54. See also RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT (report to the National Advisory Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence) (1968).
4 9 See supra note 23.
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Before presenting samples of questions prepared for the Kent 2550
trials and others from the Newton Trial,5 1 a few comments concerning
the conduct of the voir dire are in order.
The first is that if the Court does not require the voir dire to be
recorded, then the defense should demand that it is. This, of course, is
upon the realization that the case may be appealed. Secondly, it may
be advisable to remind each candidate before questioning that he is under
oath and the consequences of that. This may give the potential juror
second thoughts about the content of his words. Third, the questions
themselves should be planned with the utmost care. Certain questions
are improper, not necessarily because of their content, but because
of the way they are framed. 52 This type of question is one where
counsel attempts to place the juror in a position whereby he commits
himself to a fact before the juror has had a chance to hear the evidence,
argument of counsel or the court's instructions to the jury.53 These
questions are generally of four types:
1. Those which ask the juror what he would do if the evidence
were evenly balanced.5 4
2. Those which ask the juror to speculate as to his reaction in the
jury room under given sets of circumstances.55
3. Those which ask the juror to speculate upon evidence which has
not yet 'been introduced.5 6
50 The Kent 25 trials arose out of the killing of four students on the Kent State
University Campus by the Ohio National Guard on May 4, 1970. A grand jury
indicted the twenty-five persons for a variety of charges ranging from interference
with a fireman to first degree riot. (No National Guardsmen or state officials were
indicted.) Though the trials were ordered to continue, the Federal District Court
ordered the Grand Jury report burned because the Jury had no authority to issue
such a report. See Hammand v. Brown, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. Ohio 1971). After
three trials (in which none of the main charges were returned "guilty") and two
guilty pleas, all remaining charges were dropped by the state for lack of sufficient
evidence. The voir dire transcripts for the three trials may be obtained by writing
the Portage County Courthouse, Ravenna, Ohio, and by requesting same for case
numbered 7440, 7442, 7422.
51 See supra note 44.
52 It has generally been held that questions framed in ambiguous terms are not valid.
State v. Faciane, 233 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1958). Also held as invalid have been
those questions which are purposeful mistatements of the law. State v. Ricks, 242
La.823, 138 So.2d 589 (1963). Though in Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio
State 530, 200 N.E. 762 (1936), it was held that the actual form of the question
is at the trial judge's discretion as long as that discretion is not abused. Pavilanis
v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N.E. 730 (1929).
53 Sherman v. Ryan, 126 Conn. 574, 577, 13 A.2d 134, 135 (1940); State v. Williams,
230 La. 1059, 1079, 89 So.2d 898, 905 (1956).
54 Kurczak v. United States, 14 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1926); Chicago § A.R. Co. v.
Fisher, 141 Ili. 614, 31 N.E. 406 (1892). Hughes v. Mendendorp, 294 I1. App. 424,
431, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (3d Dist. Ct. App. I1. 1938).
55McGuire v. Richard Guthmann Transfer Co., 234 Ill. 125, 84 N.E. 723 (1908).
But see State v. Huffman, 86 Ohio St. 229, 99 N.E. 295 (1912).
56 State v. Huffman, 86 Ohio St. 229, 99 N.E. 295 (1912).
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4. A question which introduces a fact to the juror upon which a
challenge is issued because of the juror's knowledge of the fact.57
In addition, there are two other types of inquiries which can cause
problems. The first is a question which does not go to the discovery of
prejudice or bias.58 The second is an inquiry which is not within the
framework of a question. 59 Both of these are open to objection by either
the prosecution or the court.
V. SAMPLE QUESTIONS PREPARED
FOR THE "KENT 25" TRIALS
6 0
The first series of questions in the Kent 25 trials were introductory
inquiries designed to obtain general information and to "break the ice"
between counsel and the juror. They were constructed such that the defense
could obtain background data on the juror and at the same time expand
upon the question in almost a socializing manner. It is probably sufficient
to state that these questions touched upon subjects such as marital status,
age and number of children, occupation, educational background,
membership in political, church and social groups, and the juror's age.
The next group of questions were still of a general nature, but
designed to check experiences with the judicial system. They came under
the heading of "Prior Jury Duty" and some samples follow:
Q. Have you ever served on a jury before? Have you ever been
called to jury duty, but were not able to serve? If so, why?
Q. What type of case was it?
Q. Did you find it hard to be impartial?
Q. Did you enjoy serving?
Q. If chosen to serve again, could you be impartial in this trial?
The third group of questions were very important in this case
because of the fundamental position which the National Award had in
the entire affair. They questioned prior or current military service:
Q. Have you ever been, or are you now, a member of the armed
services?
Q. What branch and rank?
Q. Regular or Reserve? (It was necessary to look for National
Guard members.)
Q. Did you find it a worthwhile experience?
57 Sherman v. Ryan, 126 Conn. 574, 577, 13 A.2d 134, 135 (1940); State v. Williams,
230 La. 1059, 1079, 89 So.2d 898, 905 (1956).
58 Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934). See also State v. Huffman,
86 Ohio St. 229, 99 N.E. 295 (1912).
59 See supra note 52.
60 The questions presented here represent extracts of the voir dire and are printed in
outline form.
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Q. Did you take orders well?
Q. Would you go back in?
Q. Do you think everyone should serve?
Q. Do you have any harsh feelings toward those who do not serve?
Q. What would you do if your son refused to be drafted?
Q. Could you be impartial toward the Defendant even if he has not
served in the military?
The fourth series of questions went to the juror's understanding of
the "Presumption of Innocence":
Q. Do you realize that in our judicial system a man has to be proven
guilty-that he is assumed innocent until proven otherwise?
Q. Do you agree with this approach?
Q. Do you think Mr. is innocent?
Q. Can you accept the fact that Mr. is presumed
innocent at this very moment?
Q. Do you understand it is not the defense's job to prove Mr.
innocent?
Q. Do you realize we need prove nothing?
Q. Do you realize it is the prosecution's task to prove Mr.
.guilty-beyond a reasonable doubt?
Q. What is a reasonable doubt?
Q. Do you believe that because the Grand Jury indicted Mr.__
-that he must be guilty of something? ,
The next series of questions were the start of the attempts to have
the jurors demonstrate their prejudices. This particular series was to see
how confident the juror was in his own fairness.
Q. Is there anything about this case which troubles you?
Q. Do you believe you can be impartial?
Q. Supposing your son or daughter were on trial here-would you
feel confident with 12 jurors of your mind? (Hesitation in thejuror's responses was to be observed.)
Q. Tell me again--do you think you can be impartial?
The following series was directed at the juror's ability to stand by
his opinion. The design was to test the juror's self-assurance
Q. If you are chosen as a juror, and upon the evidence you believe
the defendant innocent, you will stick by that, right?
Q. Even if the jury is divided 11 to 1, you won't let anyone push
you around, right?
Q. You would still stand by your opinion even if you thought it
socially inadvisable?
With this group of questions, the intent was to start the actual
challenge process and also to begin educating. This series was on views
held toward universities, professors and students.
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Q. What do you think of American Universities?
Q. Do you believe it is the aim of the Universities to make students
radical?
Q. Do you think they are making students radical?
Q. Do you think some professors are communists?
Q. Should those professors be fired?
Q. Do you think University administrators are soft on student
radicals?
Q. Do University administrators perform a disservice to students'
parents if they allow pliable rules and radical courses?
Q. Do you think many students are radical?
Q. What would you do if your son or daughter went away to school
and came back radical?
Q. Is there such a thing as a radical right wing?
Q. Do you know Thomas Jefferson was instrumental in the Ameri-
can Revolution?
Q. Do you know he is considered by many to have been very
radical?
Q. What is a radical?
Q. Is that good or bad?
The influence which the news media had on the jurors was the object
of this series of questions. Here the purpose was to display media bias and
to educate the juror to the fact that the local media was anti-student.
Q. Do you think the media projected an image of the Students being
guilty of the occurrences between May 1 and May 4?
Q. Do you believe the Kent Record Courier slanted its stories
against the students?
Q. Do you think they slanted their stories in favor of the Grand
Jury report?
Q. In the sense of what is impartial-you know, like when I asked
if you could be impartial--do you think the Record Courier was
impartial?
Q. Then you think it was pro-National Guard, pro-Grand Jury, and
pro-Law and Order, right?
Q. Then how can you say it didn't affect you when that was the
only paper which you read?
Q. Can you overcome this effect?
Q. Then you are saying that the news media was not fair, but that
you are capable of being fair even in light of this, right?
The next two series of questions dealt with any connections the juror
had with local police or National Guard and what degree of support the
juror would lend these organizations. The section which follows tested
the juror's knowledge of radical organizations.
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Q. What is a radical organization?
Q. Does that include, say, the John Birch Society?
Q. What do you know about S.D.S.?
Q. What do you know about the Weathermen?
Q. Should organizations like this be allowed in the United States?
Q. What kinds of people join these organizations?
Q. Why do they join?
Q. Are Black Panthers radical?
Q. Is Richard Nixon a radical?
Q. Do you believe in free speech?
Q. Do you believe in the right of assembly?
Q. Did George Washington lead a radical group?
Q. Could you be fair with a radical on trial?
Q. Does this person have rights?
Q. Do you know any radicals?
Q. Then you admit you know little about these people, right?
Q. But you could still be fair, right?
The questions which were asked next were designed to monitor the
amount of fear the juror had toward the youth culture. This was of
considerable import because of the ages, appearance and life styles
of the defendants.
Q. Are all people with long hair radicals?
Q. What do you think of long hair on men?
Q. Would you let your son have long hair?
Q. Do people with long hair take drugs?
Q. Is marijuana habit-forming?
Q. Are hippies dirty?
Q. Are communes morally wrong?
Q. Is rock music drug-oriented?
Q. Do you think it is wrong for women to go without a bra?
Q. What is a hippie?
Q. Would you let your daughter marry one? How about if they lived
together?
Q. Do you believe in pre-marital intercourse?
Q. Are hippies basically good or bad people?
Q. Do you believe in demonstrations?
Q. Do you know who the Jefferson Airplane is? Frank Zappa?
Led Zepplin?
Q. Actually, you don't know much about all of this, do you?
Q. But you can still be fair, right?
Any encounters the potential juror had experienced with members
of the youth community and the juror's feelings towards these individuals
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as witnesses were covered next. Both sections are deleted here because
they centered around problems which were almost exclusively local in
nature. The final section, which is reprinted below in a considerably
condensed form, was composed of many general questions, some of which
were repeats of earlier inquiries.61 Some samples are as follows:
Q. Was the Kent R.O.T.C. building worth more than one student?
How about the library? The Administration Building? Let me ask
you this-is one student worth more than the Empire State
Building?
Q. What is this country's number one problem?
Q. Should communists be allowed in the United States?
Q. Why are poor people poor? Why are rich people rich?
Q. What do you think about the Chicago Seven? Huey Newton?
Daniel Ellsberg? Bobby Seale?
Q. Are you an honest person?
Q. Do you believe that you are capable of viewing things objectively
-impartially?
Q. Then you can honestly tell me that you would not mind a Black
family living next door to you, right?
VI. SAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIAL
OF HUEY P. NEWTON 6
2
What follows is an abstract of Charles Garry's questioning of a juror
on the subject of white racism.6 3
Mr. Garry: Now, Mrs. Read, you have heard me talk about white
racism. You know what white racism is?
A. Just by reading, I guess, and also by the explanations on the
panel here.
Q. And, of course, white racism only means something if it reflects
on how you react to white racism. You understand that?
A. (Juror nods affirmatively.)
Q. Where in the ladder do you belong in this white racism standard
that I have talked about this morning-as a matter of fact, I have
been talking about it for seven or eight days, but you have only
had to be victimized by one day of it. How do you feel about it?
Where do you personally fit into this white racism?
A. Well, I guess I feel just as good as the next person, and then, too,
the next person might be better than I am.
61 This technique is recommended to "check" the juror's responses. GINGER, supra
note 3, at 17.
62 GINGER, supra note 3, at 156-60.
63 Reprinted by permission, supra note 45.
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Q. In other words, there are certain areas where you are guilty or a
victim of white racism; is that what you are trying to tell me?
A. I guess-yes.
Q. Now, is this area of white racism that you have within yourself,
or white supremacy you have, is that in the area of subjective or
objective approach? The objective is something that you can
see, that everybody in the world can see that you are a racist, a
white racist. But the subjective is the one that you, yourself, are
the only one that knows anything about it where you secretly
have certain prejudgments about black people.
A. No, I haven't.
Q. I am just trying to find out what area-that you have certain
elements of white racism in you [sic]. Can you tell us, or do
you know?
A. I guess I don't know.
Q. How long have you lived in San Leandro, Mrs. Read?
A. I have lived in San Leandro about thirteen years, and previously
I lived in Oakland.
Q. Oakland?
A. From 1925.
Q. You and your family never moved out of an area because too
many black people moved in, did you?
A. We used to live in Brookfield Village.
Q. Where?
A. Brookfield Village, Oakland.
Q. You never moved out because too many black people moved
into the area?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you?
A. Yes.
Q. You moved out-
The Court: Do you understand the question?
The Juror: Pardon?
The Court: Do you understand the question?
The Juror: He asked if I moved out because there were too'many
black people moving in. Yes.
The Court: You did?
The Juror: Yes.
The Court: Where you lived before, is that why you moved out?
The Juror: Yes.
The Court: All right. You may proceed.
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Mr. Garry: You didn't like to live around black people?
A. We felt we would be better off in San Leandro.
Q. San Leandro doesn't have any black people there; maybe one or
two families-is that right?
A. I believe there is more than that.
Mr. Garry: If Your Honor please, I am going to challenge Mrs.
Read for cause.
The Court: Now tell me this: you moved out because of the fact that
you say there were too many black people moving in
where you lived before?
The Juror: The whole village moved for that cause.
The Court: Now you understand this defendant is on trial for three
charges. Now, do you think that might in any way affect
you that you couldn't be fair to him because he happens
to be not white, he is black.
The Juror: The color makes no difference.
The Court: Do you think it would have any effect at all?
The Juror: The color makes no difference. As I say, it's the deed,
not the color.
The Court: Why did you move out of the place there, because there
were too many black people?
The Juror: Pardon?
The Court: Why did that make you move, because there were too
many black people? Why did you move on that account?
Did you have children, or something?
The Juror: Well, I just felt that we would be better off in a different
neighborhood. They wanted that village for that. They
were tearing down housing projects and they needed the
village to have the colored people have some place to
live. We weren't the first ones to move out. We were
practically the last.
The Court: Well, then, you have a feeling concerning black people,
haven't you? You must be truthful in these matters. I am
not trying to get you to say answers. I just want to get
the facts. If you have a feeling, you should so state.
Some people have and some people don't have. What is
your honest feeling?
The Juror: Well, I have known very nice colored people.
The Court: How is that?
The Juror: I have friends as colored people.
The Court: Yes, I know. But you evidently didn't like them enough
to stay there when there were other people around.
The Juror: There were no other white people there.
Mr. Garry: I submit the challenge, Your Honor.
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The Court: Want to examine further, gentlemen?
Mr. Jensen (the prosecutor): Well, no, I have no other questions.
The Court: In view of the circumstances-the point is this: Do you
feel you can act with entire impartiality in this case, or
do you feel that you might have some reservations
because the defendant is black?
The Juror: Well, I would just say to the best of my knowledge and
whatever testimony is given.
The Court: You are offering the challenge?
Mr. Garry: I am submitting the challenge, Your Honor.
The Court: I think we had better excuse her. You are excused.
Within the context of the twin goals of the voir dire, minimizing the
effect of predisposed jurors and education of the jurors, the Kent and
Newton examples hopefully provide guidelines and add direction to those
who are facing, or are about to face, the problem of selecting a jury. In
both examples, the framework of the voir dire strategy is evident and can
easily be adapted to other similar situations. Though it surely is not
assumed that questions structured as these will eliminate prejudice or
bias, it is submitted that this type of organization will go far toward
weeding out the worst jurors and minimizing the probability of a verdict
representing predisposed opinions based on race, political beliefs, or
standing in the social hierarchy.
VII. CHALLENGES: FOR CAUSE AND PEREMPTORY
There are two types of challenges which may be executed: the
challenge for cause, which may be exercised as often as needed; and
the peremptory challenge, which is not for cause, and is limited in number.
As mentioned earlier, both share inherent weaknesses, 64 a fact which must
be coped with if their use is to be at all effective. The process of challenge
within this framework thus becomes a second-rate tool or a band-aid to be
applied to a wound which needs major surgery. It should be understood
from the outset that the problem does not revolve around the mechanics
of the challenge, but around its application, which can be used to fortify
unrepresentative as well as representative juries. Within this structure, the
challenge shall be explored.
The challenge for cause, though a somewhat cumbersome tool,65 is
nevertheless the main implement for determining which members of the
panel will be rejected as jurors. In most jurisdictions, this challenge
is controlled by statutory law, 66 which sets rigid standards for exercising
64See supra notes 11-12.
65 Because of the statutory standards for its exercise and the trial judge's discretionary
power, the challenge for cause becomes rather awkward to utilize. Much detail is
needed to effectuate this type of challenge. See GINGER, supra note 3, at 81-198.
66 OHIO RaV. CODE § 2945.25 (1953).
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the challenge. 67 Further, it is within the trial judge's discretion as to
accepting or rejecting the challenge.68 (It is important to note here
that this is only reversible error if one can prove an abuse of discretion.
Much of the likelihood of the court accepting the challenge will be
hinged on whether it is based on actual or implied bias. Actual bias exists
when the potential juror's state of mind is such that he can not be impartial
in reference to the case or the parties involved. 69 This situation is the most
difficult one in which to issue the challenge because the juror is required
to demonstrate a state of mind to the court that shows him to be
predisposed in a prejudicial manner towards a major element of the
trial, be it race, life style, or philosophy. Actual bias is founded upon
the perceptual element-how one views a given set of circumstances. If
the juror is racially biased, such constitutes actual bias since this reflects
the juror's perception of his environment, and is grounds for challenge.
Implied bias differs from the above example in that the focal point
is on the juror and his relationship to the case or parties.70 This test, unlike
actual bias, is not based upon perception; rather, it is a physical evaluation
of the juror in relation to the case. It has been defined to be an intentional
non-disclosure of a material fact.7' Though helpful, this definition leads
one to think of the juror consciously deceiving the court as the prerequisite
for challenge. This is not the case-the juror is merely required to
answer those questions directed at him; it is counsel's task to ask the right
questions, such that the various elements of the relationship may be
assembled. An example of an implied bias relationship may further clarify
this point. A police officer is injured during a demonstration and whether
assault comprises one of the charges or not, it is likely the officer will
testify as a prosecution witness and further, that on the list of prospective
jurors there may be someone associated with the officer-such as a
married sister who no longer has the same name or the nurse that attended
the officer. Both of these women would be open to challenge for implied
bias on relationship, not on their state of mind. The difference between
implied bias and actual bias thus comes down to the point of not the
prejudiced bias itself, for that exists in both, but how the bias has
been affectuated.
The peremptory challenge is both an effective weapon for and
67 OHio REv. CODE § 2945.25 (1953) [though the actual form which the challenge takes
is not designated]. See Burnett v. State, 30 Ohio Ct. App. 465, 467 (1917).
68 Pavilanis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N.E. 730; OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.27
(1957).
69 GINGER, supra note 3, at 13. See also Kerr v. B.F.Goodrich Co., 22 Ohio L. Abs.
685, 31 N.E.2d 709 (9th Dist. Ct. Summit County 1936).
70 GINGER, supra note 3, at 13.
71 Petro v. Donner, 137 Ohio St. 168, 28 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County
1940).
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against the defense, a condition which cancels out much of the benefits
of its use. Both sides in the litigation are given an equal number of
peremptory challenges based on state statute.72 The theoretical asset
is that either side may strike from the panel a limited number of jurors
who are thought to be biased but could not be removed for cause because
this could not be demonstrated to the court. Counsel need only inform
the court that it is exercising the challenge and the juror is then excused7 3
The problem develops when, as in many cases, the prosecution uses the
challenge to remove blacks, 74 or as in the Newton case, when young
persons and Berkeley residents were excluded. 75 Though the issue of
peremptory challenge of blacks has been approached on a number
of appeals,76 only once has the Supreme Court confronted the problem
directly. In Swain v. Alabama,77 the Court held that it was the petitioner's
burden to prove systematic exclusion of blacks by peremptory challenge, a
burden which they failed to meet. The Court found that blacks were
underrepresented by only ten per cent as compared to their relation to the
population, a figure which was held insufficient to prove prima facie
discrimination and thus evade the systematic exclusion rule.78 It should be
noted that the Court's mathematics in Swain have not gone without
criticism, both by writers 79 and the Court.80 In retrospect it would appear
that a combination of poor mathematics and strained logic have done
a rather thorough job of halting further review of the practice which
enforces white racism at the whim of the prosecution.
The difficulties expressed above lead one to approach the peremptory
challenge not as a weapon of offense, but as a prophylactic plug to
checkmate its use as a tool of racism or social prejudice. Inasmuch as this
condition establishes the boundaries of reality with the peremptory
challenge, the task then becomes one of optimizing its use. A number of
general suggestions may assist in obtaining full performance of this
challenge. First, as one writer suggests, it may be helpful to chart the
challenges as they are exercised.8 This is done by drawing a box chart of
72 OHIO REv. CODE HI 2945.21 (6 challenges in capital cases), 2945.22 (4 challenges
in non-capital).
73 Omo REv. CODE § 2945.1 (1953). See also Pavilanis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St.
154, 165 N.E. 730 (1929).
74 See supra note 33.
7 5 GINGER, supra note 3, at xx, xxi.
76 Watkins v. State, 199 Ga. 81, 33 S.E.2d 235 (1945); State v. Barkdale, 247 La.
198, 170 So.2d 374 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 291 (1965).
7 7 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 226 (1965).
78 Id. at 208, 209.
79 Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimi-
nation Cases, 80 H~Av. L. REV. 338, 346 (1966).
S Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 56 (5th Cir. 1966).
81 Selection of the Jury, 14 TR. LAW. GUIDE 21, 24, 25, 35, 36 (May 1970), as
reprinted from GOLDSTEN TRIuL TECHNIQUES.
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the jury seats as shown above and registering each side's challenge
as it is exercised. It is asserted that this method eliminates confusion and
as such, protects against the odds of announcing a challenge only to
find none left.82 This approach may in fact be of value when one considers
that in many jurisdictions, such as Ohio,83 the number of challenges is per
defendant, not per trial, and that in many political trials there are multiple
defendants. Elementary mathematics in that type of case can result in
a fairly high number of challenges and likewise a rather substantial degree
of confusion. Secondly, in cases where it is possible, it may be advisable to
abandon the peremptory challenge until the "final" jury is all but sworn
in. This gives one a better perspective of its composition and protects
against alienating jurors early in the voir dire, a situation which can easily
occur if the jurors see their fellows removed for "no reason." Although
this approach has been challenged on appeal, it has been upheld as a valid
technique.8 Lastly, if the circumstances of the case are such that all the
peremptory challenges are not exercised (a very unlikely occurrence), it
should be inserted in the record that requests for change of venue,
continuances and appeals are not being waived by failure to execute
all the challenges.
The political or social trial, because of the vast sociological problems
inherently woven through it, leaves the peremptory challenge in a position
of diminished value. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that, at best,
this challenge will minimize the presence of predisposed jurors and, at
worst, it will act as a countervailing force on the prosecution. The
peremptory challenge is a positive factor, its value is merely one of degree.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Drawing conclusions is a risky business. To do so infers that the
subject matter is either stagnant or of such a nature that it may be
suspended in a cataleptic state while the observer traces its form and
boundaries unencumbered by its lifelessness, a manner of inquiry which
finds sanctuary in few areas of investigation. This is not to suggest that
pulse reading and barometer gauging are always without merit. These
practices may be worthwhile, if engaged in without the guise of finality.
82 Id. at 35, 36.
83 OHIo REv. CODE 1 2945.22 (1953). See also Bixbie v. State, 6 Ohio 86 (1833).
84 Hooker v. State, 4 Ohio 348 (1831).
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As such it would be singularly inappropriate to draw conclusions about
voir dire in political and social trials, particularly because much of the
difficulty does not exist in the actual voir dire in these trials; rather, it is
the fact that these trials exist at all.
Historically, it has not been the tyranny of open destruction of the
throne's enemies which has marred history, for intellectually that would
be too honest; the darkest moments have come with the inquisition of the
dissenter. And so it is with political and social inquests, for they represent
the aborted utilization of the very principle which those in power purport
to so zealously protect. It is upon these facts that one finds it difficult to
construct final remarks and conversely, that one finds it necessary to have
indulged in the first place. As such the "conclusion" of this comment can
only be the disconcerting fact that the subject matter even exists.
MURRAY R. BOWES*
* The writer, a second-year law student, did the voir dire research and question
design for the Kent 25 trials, as a member of the Kent Legal Defense Fund. For
the details of the trials see supra note 50.
The author would like to extend his appreciation to attorney Charles Garry of
San Francisco and Ms. Ann Ginger for their assistance and cooperation in the
preparation of this comment.
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